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ABSTRACT: This paper accepts the challenge posed by Godfrey Baldacchino in “Islands and 
despots”,  published  in  Commonwealth  &  Comparative  Politics  in  February  2012,  to 
acknowledge and investigate the implications of the “expressions of harmony and solidarity” 
often observed in small island societies. To do so, aspects of the Isle of Man’s political and 
social life are discussed from the perspectives of popular rule and rationality. This paper argues 
that a homogeneity in preferences and the political practices of small island states might be a 
rational way of protecting a vulnerable economy and thus ensuring economic growth and a 
sufficient allocation to each island resident of the scarce resources required to survive. Such 
small island homogeneity and consensualism is therefore not necessarily indicating a deficient 
democratic practice, but might just connote another way of conducting democratic governance, 
spawned from a particular way of living and a particular range of needs. 
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Introduction  
 
On the Isle of Man, a small island jurisdiction right in the middle of the Irish Sea, there is a 
saying that people on the island suffer from the Manx crabs syndrome, described by one of the 
residents as follows:   
’Manx Crabs’ is the idea that people will tend to criticize both their equals but also 
anyone that they consider is getting above his [sic] station, and the image comes 
from, if you’re fishing for crabs, and you’ve caught crabs, and you put them in a 
bucket, they all try to sort of climb over each other, but by doing that they pull each 
other down. And so the crabs don’t get out. It doesn’t matter how hard they work at 
it, no crab will ever get to the top and climb out of the bucket, and this image is 
described as being this idea of Manx Crabs, but it’s to do with people generally on 
the Island having a healthy disregard for a class system, it’s actually kind of very 
flat, you don’t get hierarchies, or if you do, they don’t last for long. At some level, 
it tracks itself down, the crabs drag everything down (Ahlbom, 2013, p. 24).
1 
                                                 
1 During 2012, I studied the Isle of Man’s political system as part of my thesis, which was a qualitative study of 
the Manx political system, emphasizing the structure of consensus within parliament and the non-party system. 
Empirical  data  was  collected  through  conversational  interviews,  literature  about  the  Isle  of  Man’s  politico-
economic history, and by direct observations of sittings of the House of Keys and Tynwald. 
 T. Ahlbom 
  124
It is this kind of attitudinal homogeneity and the apparently active struggle towards it that is 
discussed in Godfrey Baldacchino’s paper “Islands and despots” (2012). The author argues 
that, even though the democratic institutions and the “getting along” of small island states may 
seem like paradise from the perspective of an outsider (such as the researchers who have time 
and time again concluded that “small is democratic”), the societal structures of such small 
islands may connote “hell for dissidents” (ibid., pp. 112-3). In other words, it might seem 
desirable and unproblematic to the fishers that none of the crabs they have caught manage to 
escape their bucket, but for those crabs attempting to climb out in protest of being captured or 
in fear of their lives, the constant pulling of their fellow bucket inhabitants may indeed be a 
hellish experience. But what then are the crabs supposed to do? Staying together in the bucket 
might be the rational choice, if the togetherness is perceived by the crabs as the only way of 
surviving in the bucket. On a purely hypothetical level, it may therefore be the will of the 
manifold of the crabs for all to stay in the bucket. What, then, are the premises of such a 
rationality  assumption  when  questioning  the  specific  variant  of  democracy  and  good 
governance in a bucket-society? The rule by the incumbent government, whether based on a 
majority or a minority mandate, implies that there are always parliamentary members opposing 
the government policy. Those parliamentary members are the representatives of a number of 
individuals in the society, whose wishes will be pushed to the side because the incumbent 
government is wishing for something else, in much the same way as the crabs trying to climb 
out of the bucket are dragged back down.  Salman Rushdie once wrote that; 
[I]n every generation there are a few souls, call them lucky or cursed, who are 
simply born not belonging, who come into the world semi-detached, if you like, 
without strong affiliation to family or location or nation or race; … there may even 
be millions, billions of such souls, as many non-belongers as belongers, perhaps; 
that, in sum, the phenomenon may be as ‘natural’ a manifestation of human nature 
as its opposite (Rushdie, 1999, pp. 72-73). 
In  every  democracy,  dissidents  and  non-belongers  will  occur.  Whether  on  a  societal  or  a 
parliamentary level, the predominant habitat for dissidents will be hell, as they might get what 
they need for survival but not what they want. This paper aims to argue, using the Isle of Man 
as  an  illustrative  example,  how  a  small  island  democracy  with  a  seemingly  extensive 
homogeneity in attitudes on a national level, may be different from the democratic practices of 
larger countries, however not necessarily being less democratic in the fundamental meaning of 
the word. It is a largely unsubstantiated and most often an implicit assumption that democratic 
government is inherently founded on dissent and opposition, and that democratic practices and 
institutions  consequentially  lose  constitutional  meaningfulness  where  and  when  there  is  no 
heterogeneous set of values and preferences – represented by a large number of parties (Anckar 
& Anckar, 2000) – in a polity. The widespread focus upon competing political parties and 
contentious voting processes has, for example, been promoted by Schumpeter (2010, pp. 226-
241), who has argued that the imperfectness of human rationality calls not for emphasis upon 
the (according to him non-existing) classical democracy doctrine of “the will of the people” but 
upon the act of selecting representatives. The power of this frame of mind is not surprising 
considering that the modern world consists mainly of large-scale representative democracies. 
In this paper, I advocate the importance of noting that democracy is not inevitably connected to 
diametrical  heterogeneity  in  preferences  and  an  organizational  need  for  representative 
government  as  opposed  to  participatory  government  (e.g.  Pitkin  2004),  especially  when             On the rationality of Manx crabs 
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studying  small  islands.  Nor  are  attitudes  inevitably  interconnected  to  preferences.  The 
Schumpeterian  frame  of  mind,  which  I  will  refer  to  as  the  democracy  assumption,  is 
problematized and partly questioned in this paper by introducing a rationality assumption. 
Isle of Man politics 
The politics of the Isle of Man do, in many ways, converge with the concerns of Baldacchino 
(2012). The political system is characterized by an underlying consensus and an absence of 
party politics (Kermode, 2008, pp. 193-8). In this case, an underlying consensus implies that 
there is no organized opposition in parliament and that politicians are expected to strive for 
consensus when making decisions. The candidates who stand for election to parliament and to 
local authorities on the Isle of Man are mostly ‘independents’ without any party affiliation, 
even  though  there  are,  and  have  been  throughout  history,  a  number  of  parties  offering 
candidates for election. The consensus in parliament is promoted by a system of executive 
branch dominance, where the Chief Minister of the executive branch (the Council of Ministers) 
is  chosen  by  the  parliament,  Tynwald,  as  a  whole  and  therefore  has  an  extremely  high 
legitimacy. The constitution also provides for ‘a system of responsible government’, meaning 
that  the  Council  of  Ministers  is  responsible  to  Tynwald;  and,  even  though  constitutional 
legislation empowers Tynwald to force the Council of Ministers to resign with a motion of no 
confidence, it also gives the Council of Ministers the ‘position of collective leadership’. This 
constitutional position makes the Council of Ministers increasingly anxious to keep a united 
front (ibid., pp. 214-5), and “[i]n the absence of disciplined parties, this has been a source of 
considerable strength, making them the best organised group in Tynwald” (ibid.). There is also 
a system of “block vote”, which in short is a procedure where the Council of Ministers ties the 
members  of  the  House  of  Keys  (the  parliament’s  lower  branch)  to  them  via  departmental 
appointments and statutory boards and in that way  ensures that a majority of the votes in 
Tynwald will be cast in line with the Council of Ministers.  
The implications of the block vote are many. It creates a political system that resembles 
a party system, because of the emergence of a government policy. What differentiates the 
governmental policies of the Isle of Man from the governmental policies in the majority of 
other countries is the fact that the government policy is created post election. The parliament 
ends up with a de facto consensus because the best way to make a difference as an elected 
politician in parliament is to work inside a department as a departmental member, and hope to 
eventually be made minister. To sum up, there is a variety of independent and party bound 
candidates to vote for in an Isle of Man election, but through parliamentary practices one sole 
party is organised post election¸ within the parliament (Ahlbom, 2013). This unusual approach 
towards a governmental policy on the Isle of Man is one of the customs frequently debated 
within parliament (King, 2013, p. 131) as well as by one of the island’s many interest groups, 
the  Positive  Action  Group  which  advocates  an  “open,  accountable  government,  rigorous 
control  of  public  finances,  and  a  fairer  society  for  all”  (PAG,  2014).  These  are,  however, 
democratic values common to most democracy exponents. This paper would like to point out 
that the rationality for developing a system of this sort could be the economic vulnerability of a 
small island jurisdiction, rather than the tendencies of small island politics towards despotism 
per se. Using the Isle of Man case as an example, this paper hopes to shed some light on 
possible explanations for the design of small island variety of democracy and  governance, 
other than despotic tendencies, homogeneity in attitudes, and the ostracizing of dissidents.   T. Ahlbom 
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Small island democracy and economy 
Dag and Carsten Anckar have, in several publications, tried to explain the political systems of 
small island states by analysing factors such as British political heritage and plurality in the 
same manner as Arendt Lijphart does in his classic work, Patterns of Democracy (Lijphart, 
1999/2012; Anckar, D., 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2013a; Anckar, C., 2008; Anckar, & 
Anckar 1995, 2000). However, they have not been able to completely explain the institutional 
choices of small island states by using Lijphart’s explanatory hypothesis that it is “the presence 
or absence of a British political heritage that appears to explain the distribution ... better than 
any geographical factor” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 250). D. Anckar has stated that “aspects of culture 
and rationality may be intertwined to an extent that makes an analytical distinction between the 
two dimensions almost impossible” (Anckar, D., 2008, p. 81). When discussing the correlation 
between the characteristics of small island democracies and their economies, it is therefore 
advantageous to use the key concept of “islandness”, within which the aspects of culture and 
rationality are already intertwined. Islandness includes features such as: common problems 
among  islanders  connected  to  the  geographic  features  of  an  island;  “willingness  to  learn, 
flexibility  and  the  readiness  to  adapt”  as  a  consequence  of  having  a  vulnerable  economy; 
“minimal social class and status barriers” in order to enhance dynamic learning capacity; a 
certain kind of nationalism, where the public tend to watch the politicians closely because they 
link their own identities to that of the state, and where the same kind of strong connection and 
supervision can also be found in between individuals  of the public (Baldacchino, 2005, pp. 36-
38); small social distance between those governed and those governing (e.g. Hirczy, 1995, pp. 
256-259); the ability of individuals to grasp and understand political life; extremely closely 
knitted social networks; social limits to conflict and a sense of “community” and the absence 
of  a  sense  of  “alienation”  in  the  relationship  between  individuals  and  the  state  apparatus 
(Richards, 1982, pp. 158-9); however, in a “World War I way”, conflicts may escalate because 
of the many alliances between individuals (Baldacchino 2005, p. 36). It is also worth noting 
that some island states are archipelagos, and that the level of geographic fragmentation has its 
effect on the intensity of the islandness features. 
In the Isle of Man case, the geography is contiguous and the small internal market and 
the few natural resources on the island make it profoundly dependent on its largest economic 
sectors;  finance  and  business  (Kermode,  2008,  p.  16)  to  maintain  economic  growth  and 
standard of living, and this dependency is something that the islanders are aware of. One island 
inhabitant describes his worries as follows: 
The only thing that differentiates us from one of the western islands of Scotland is 
that we’ve got finance industry. And, if you took that away, we would be poor in 
the way that the western islands are poor. […] people go to the western islands for 
tourism,  people  come  to  the  Isle  of  Man  for  tourism,  but  you’ve  got  tourism, 
farming, fishing, and those three sorts of things are the things that we share, and the 
difference is that we have this finance industry. And of course the question is: what 
happens if we don’t? (Ahlbom, 2013, p. 29). 
One could therefore argue that the effective and consensual government of the Isle of Man 
enables the finance industry to grow, due to the fact that it offers certainty and policy stability 
when, as a company dealing with the government; what the Chief Minister says will happen 
most certainly will, and government policy is not likely to change radically when an election is             On the rationality of Manx crabs 
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held.  Thus,  some  would  argue  that  it  is  a  governmental  structure  supportive  of  economic 
growth and by extension the survival of the small island democracy, with “communities such 
as Malta, Faroe, and Mann [that] can be differentiated from both the style of national and local 
politics  in  the  large  polities  of  the  world  and  stand  on  their  own  in  a  specific  category” 
(Richards,  1982,  p.  170).  The  economic  implications  of  island  geography  (Birch,  1958; 
Baldacchino, 1993) not only create common problems among the islanders, but also a dynamic 
society that is ready to adapt and is willing to learn in order to survive economically (Anckar, 
1999, p. 30).  
S. E. Finer argues, in Lijphart’s words, that “macroeconomic management requires not 
so much a strong hand as a steady one” (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 259-260), and in the extreme 
economic vulnerability of small island geography, the Isle of Man seems to have constructed, 
as Richards (1982) has argued, its own political system. Both a strong and steady government 
are  created  by  using  some  of  the  strengthening  majoritarian  institutions  found  in  the 
Westminster-style  parliament,  and  allowing  the  steadiness  to  occur  by  enshrining  the  old 
consensual  traditions  of  the  Viking  Tynwald  in  combination  with  establishing  the  sort  of 
“block vote” that has been outlined above. 
The  relevance  of  strong  and  steady  government  in  vulnerable  island  economies 
becomes even clearer when indulging in research on the topics of tax havens and small island 
economies  (SIEs).  Research  conducted  by  Dhammika  and  Hines  (2009)  regarding  “which 
countries become tax havens”, suggest that it is small, affluent island economies with high 
governance qualities that have the best prospects. Hampton (2002) discusses the implications 
for small island tax havens, and brings to our attention that many SIE’s are dependent upon 
offshore finance, because of the “barriers to diversification arising from their smallness and 
unique  political  economies”.  Hampton  also  mentions the  work  of  Baldacchino  (1993)  that 
reviews the survival strategies of developing micro-economies, where he argues that micro-
state economies may be successful if they resort to “opportunist pragmatism”, such as taking 
advantage of the possibilities of being partly dependent on a larger economy: “To succeed in 
development is to perceive and exploit the possibilities and mitigate the obstacles as these 
emerge, in compliance with the basic formulations of what is understood by development in 
particular contexts” (ibid., p. 36); in other words, to be dynamic and always ready to make the 
most economically efficient decisions. 
Assumptions of democracy and rationality 
When you have no picture of the world, you don't know how to make choices - 
material, inconsequential or moral. You don't know which way is up, or if you're 
coming or going, or how many beans make five (Rushdie, 1999, p. 487). 
Historically, ideas on what is small and what is democratic have of course altered. As Dahl and 
Tufte (1973, p. 1) write: “to an Athenian democrat at the time of Pericles, the Netherlands – a 
‘small country’ – would seem a gigantic empire, fit only for despotic emperors and slavish 
citizens”. The classic representative democracy doctrine, as presented by Schumpeter, is all 
about the will of the people and has been largely replaced by scepticism towards the idea of a 
cohesive will of the people and the successive emphasis on the act of voting (2010, p. 241). 
However, this distinction between doctrines is merely an organizational one, provided that we 
embrace the basic definition of democracy as “a practical form of decision-making that derives 
its normative legitimacy from the degree to which it approaches the ideals on which it is based T. Ahlbom 
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… [and] derives its sociological legitimacy from the degree to which it works in practice.” 
(Mansbridge  et  al.,  2010,  p.  84).  As  long  as  the  practical  dimension  of  democracy  is 
acknowledged, the variety of democracies in the world becomes easier to understand. 
In “Islands and Despots”, Baldacchino writes that, in small island states, “[d]emocratic 
practices and supporting institutions may exist and operate, and a semblance of pluralism will 
be manifest, but all these are likely to be overshadowed by what Dahl and Tufte … refer to as a 
‘single code’” (2012, p. 109). The societal situation of a “single code” is one where “norms … 
are easily communicated by word and example, violations are visible, sanctions are easy to 
apply by means of both gross and subtle forms of social interaction, and avoidance of sanctions 
is difficult” (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, p. 92). These are features that may have different effects in 
different contexts, affecting for example prospects of political accountability, prerequisites for 
consensus, and information costs. If we were to create a contradiction between pluralism and 
its democratic institutions (formal as well as informal) and the homogeneous society, we would 
create a base for the above-mentioned democracy assumption; since there is a dominant ‘single 
code’ in a society, democratic practices and institutions are unable to foster good governance.  
Since most political science research, as mentioned above, focuses on geographically 
and demographically large states where a single code is less likely to be present, the democracy 
assumption is more often than not present as well. Students of political science are taught to 
think  of  democratic  institutions  as  existing  in  order  to  “handle”  a  range  of  heterogeneous 
preferences and attitudes, consequently making democratic institutions worthless and shallow 
if  there  are  no  such  heterogeneous  prerequisites.  I  would  like  to  argue  that  democratic 
institutions exist in order to enable popular rule, whether or not the people agree on what they 
want. In the case of the Isle of Man and small island democracies more generally, it seems 
plausible to argue that the vulnerability of the island economy creates common interests and 
preferences for the islanders, going above and beyond their attitudes, making the alternative of 
consensual democracy look like an effective, rational governmental alternative. Hermansson 
(1984) touches upon this when differentiating between Rousseau’s concepts of volonté général 
(the general will) and volonté de tous (the will of the many). Volonté general can be interpreted 
as an accumulated preference that is common for all; what has, in this paper, been referred to 
as “the will of the people”. Volonté de tous on the other hand is the aggregated individual 
preferences of the people (Hermansson 1984, p. 346), which could instead be referred to as 
attitudes,  and  this  should  lead  to  a  discussion  of  the  possibilities  of  separating  individual 
attitudes from preferences. 
I seek to deploy the rationality assumption in order to problematize the democracy 
assumption  as  based  on  Anthony  Downs’  classical  paper  An  economic  theory  of  political 
action in a democracy. In Downs’ theory, the political action of a certain agent, whether it is an 
individual or a group of people, is the outcome of rational behaviour; in Downs’ words “it 
proceeds towards its goals with a minimal use of scarce resources and undertakes only those 
actions  for  which  marginal  return  exceeds  marginal  cost”  (Downs,  1957,  p.  137).  The 
argumentation of this paper is based on the notion that, in a small island democracy such as the 
Isle of Man, it is possible for a volonté général to form, as well as common goals towards 
which citizens will proceed in a rational manner. This may be due to the factors associated with 
islandness,  and  more  specifically  to  the  economic  vulnerability  that  exists  as  compared  to 
larger economies. This principle is the same as that of Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of 
needs:  security  of  resources  trumps  and  precedes  the  goals  of  self-actualization  (Maslow, 
1943). It is important to bear in mind here that the term ‘rational’ is synonymous, in economic             On the rationality of Manx crabs 
  129  
theory,  with  being  ‘efficient’,  and  “must  not  be  confused  with  the  logical  definition  (i.e., 
pertaining  to  logical  propositions)  or  the  psychological  (i.e.,  calculating  or  unemotional)” 
(Downs, 1957, p. 137). When assuming this meaning of the term, “it is always rational to 
perform any act if its marginal return is larger than its marginal cost” (ibid., p. 146). As this is 
originally an economic theory, the possible obstacles on an agent’s political path comprise any 
difficulties to obtain information regarding the decision to be taken. The nature of political 
action  will,  as  a  result  of  this,  vary  depending  on  the  costs  of  information  in  the  agent’s 
surroundings. 
Downs’ economic theory of political action questions the view of democratic politics as 
a context where the actual outcome of an action also provides the true incentives behind the 
action (ibid., p. 136). For example, the fact that a government succeeds in providing welfare to 
its citizens does not necessarily mean that it sought to be elected into office in order to do so; 
the government is part of the division of labour in the sense that it has “both a private motive 
and  a  social  function”  (ibid.).  Politicians  are  therefore  most  likely  to  stand  for  election 
motivated by their private interest such as earning an income and power, but while in office 
they may “nevertheless carry out their functions with great efficiency, at least under certain 
conditions” (ibid.). In conclusion, Downs’ central hypothesis reads as follows,  
 
They  [political  parties]  do  not  seek  to  gain  office  in  order  to  carry  out  certain 
preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest groups; rather they formulate 
policies when in power and serve interest groups in order to gain office. Thus their 
social function – which is to formulate and carry out policies when in power as the 
government – is accomplished as a by-product of their private motive – which is to 
attain the income, power and prestige of being in office … In effect, it [the government] 
is an entrepreneur selling policies for votes instead of products for money (Downs, 
1957, p. 137).  
 
In much the same manner, Downs argue that that the voter (at least in a world of perfect 
knowledge where information is free) “votes for whatever party he believes would provide him 
with the highest utility income from government action”, based on the previous performances 
of the party (ibid., p. 138); or, in the Isle of Man case, the individual politician. But, as we all 
know, there is no such world of perfect knowledge and costless information. This imperfection 
makes for certain tweaks on the political institutions of a society. In Downs’ model, imperfect 
knowledge  means  three  things:  1)  that  “parties  do  not  always  know  exactly  what  citizens 
want”, 2) that “citizens do not always know what the government or its opposition has done, is 
doing, or should be doing to serve their interests”, and 3) “that the information needed to 
overcome both types of ignorance is costly – in other words, scarce resources must be used to 
produce and assimilate it” (ibid., p. 139). The implications of these conditions on political 
action are, in Downs’ model, three: “persuasion, ideologies, and rational ignorance” (ibid.).  
In the small island democracy of the Isle of Man, where the ballots are free and fair and 
citizens may legally organize a party or any other interest group, a rationality perspective on 
the Manx society’s democratic workings puts it in a much more sympathetic light. Firstly, the 
individual  Manx  citizen  is  probably  less  omitted  to  persuasion  than  a  citizen  of  a  larger, 
mainland democracy. Factors of islandness and smallness, such as close social networks and a 
“politically savvy public” (e.g. Baldacchino, 2005a; 2012; Hirczy 1995; Richards, 1982), make 
the path from need to political action less covered with information costs by making it easier T. Ahlbom 
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for citizens to know “what the government is doing, and what other parties would do if they 
were in power” (Downs, 1957, p. 139). The higher the costs for finding out “what is happening 
to them or what would happen to them if another party were in power” (ibid. 140), the higher 
the risk for persuaders to provide biased information in order to secure their own personal 
interests (ibid.). If person A can persuade person B to vote in line with person A’s personal 
interests due to person B having trouble getting information enough to know what will benefit 
him or her the most, person A becomes more politically important than person B because 
person A can influence more votes than he or she can cast in the free and fair ballots. Because 
the  rational  government  is  selling  policies  for  votes,  it  becomes  more  important  for  the 
government to adapt its policies to person A’s than to person B’s needs, creating political 
inequality because; “[i]n fact, it is irrational for a democratic government to treats its citizens 
with equal deference in a world in which knowledge is imperfect” (ibid.). 
The above mentioned factors of islandness and smallness not only enable citizens to 
know their government and the government’s actions; it also enables the government to know 
its  citizens’  needs  and  preferences.  Lack  of  information  going  from  the  public  to  the 
government  forces  the  government  to  decentralize  by  means  of  representatives  “until  the 
marginal vote-gain from greater conformity to popular desires is equal to the marginal vote-
loss  caused  by  reduced  ability  to  co-ordinate  its  actions”  (ibid.).  The  government’s 
representatives,  the  link  between  those  governed  and  those  governing  are  also  in  position 
where they have huge possibilities to persuade voters to align their interests with their own, a 
decentralized democracy will therefore be more politically unequal (ibid.). 
The lack of a strong party system on the Isle of Man can also be explained by the 
rationality assumption, arguing that it is an outcome of low initial information costs rather than 
the  oppression  of  opposition  building,  because  ideologies  are  merely  a  way  of  reducing 
information costs for voters. In a large, complex society, this is needed because “the cost in 
time  alone  of  comparing  all  the  ways  in  which  the  policies  of  competing  parties  differ  is 
staggering” (ibid., p. 141). If there is a clear correlation between a party’s ideology and its 
policies, the voter’s path to a rational decision is simplified by the shortcut of ideology (ibid., 
p. 142). The relative lack of political ideologies on the Isle of Man would, with this reasoning, 
make for a stable government, no matter how many parties exist. Attitudinal homogeneity in 
small island states and territories, reported by many (e.g. Baldacchino, 2005a, 2012; Anckar, 
1999, 2004, 2008; Anckar & Anckar, 1995; Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Richards, 1982), implies that 
the  vast  majority  of  the  voters  would  agree  on  political  matters.  Because  the  government 
follows the “nature of the distribution of voters along the left-right scale” (Downs, 1957, p. 
145)  in  designing  policies,  a  polity  with  a  high  degree  of  attitudinal  (or  preferential) 
homogeneity where a large proportion of the voters are situated “within a narrow range of that 
scale” (ibid.) will be getting a government with more effective and well-integrated policy-sets, 
and a higher ability to solve social problems (ibid., pp. 144, 145) and pursue economic growth, 
as  mentioned  above  (Lijphart,  1999,  pp.  259-260).  The  initially  low  information  costs 
stemming from the smallness of the society and the close social networks creates a political 
arena which is rationally possible for the citizens to grasp and understand (Dahl & Tufte, 1973, 
p.  15).  The  mere  opportunity  to  explore  a  bigger  set  of  alternatives  does  however  not 
necessarily mean that citizens will explore those alternatives, as Lupia and McCubbins (1998, 
p. 6) put it: “ignoring useless information is necessary for humans and other species to survive 
and  prosper”.    It  is  the  marginal  gain  of  exploring  the  alternatives  that  has  to  exceed  the 
marginal cost, and the costs are likely to be higher in a larger democracy. The outcomes of             On the rationality of Manx crabs 
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citizens’  more  or  less  rational  decisions  may  then  very  well  be  the  same  ones  in  a  small 
democracy as in a large one. If one would feel the urge to make a normative statement on the 
subject,  it  would  therefore  have  to  be  about  which  decision  making  process  is  the  most 
desirable: one where there is a small number of alternatives and the citizen knows them all, or 
where there is a large number of alternatives and the citizen knows a limited selection of them. 
Political action, when it comes to the Isle of Man’s political scene, can be seen as both 
the introduction and subsequent use of ministerial government and the block vote in parliament 
and  the  homogeneity  in  attitudes,  postulating  that  it  is  this  homogeneity  in  attitudes  that 
legitimizes the political actions of the government through free and secret ballots. The Isle of 
Man differs from the majority of democracies in the world not only because of its unique 
parliamentary  system  but  also  because  of  its  lack  of  political  parties.  There  is  a  striking 
absence of party culture on the Isle of Man and the electoral campaigns are indeed based on the 
personalities  and  social  networks  of  the  candidates.  However,  there  are  no  restrictions  or 
prohibitions  towards  political  parties;  they  just  don’t  succeed  in  gaining  parliamentary 
representation (Ahlbom 2013). This is the case in a number of other small island democracies 
as well, such as Jersey (Jersey Evening Post, 2008), Guernsey (States of Guernsey website), 
the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru (Anckar & Anckar 2000, pp. 239-240). 
Conclusion 
 
This paper is loosely based on a case study of the Isle of Man, a self-governing sub-national 
island jurisdiction. The oppositions towards case studies are many (see for example Anckar 
2013b, p. 16), one of the main arguments being that “you cannot generalize from a single case” 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 219). This very valid argument is one of the reasons that this paper aims to 
contribute with an additional perspective to the discussion about democracy in small island 
states  and  societies,  rather  than  generating  generalizable  knowledge.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
democratic governance at the sub-national level where we can find jurisdictions such as the 
British  Crown  Dependencies  of  Jersey,  Guernsey  and  the  Isle  of  Man  has  been  scarcely 
researched and academic discussion about their democracy and governance is limited. Future 
researchers that would like to study how and where democracy can be brought about have a 
huge asset in the small island democracies around the world, and a challenging task in trying to 
show evidence of or reject that, under certain conditions, it could be rational and possible to 
cooperate by changing preference without changing attitudes. 
Rational choice theory, the idea of rational individuals rejected by Schumpeter and used 
in this paper, is known for being an ideal model. This means that theoretical reasoning is 
taking place within a model world where information is perfect. In this world, individuals are 
able to act rationally since they have all the information they need in order to do so. Thus, the 
only intrinsic claim of rational choice theory is that its predictions will be better the closer the 
real world is to the model world. Considering this, there wouldn’t necessarily have to be a 
contradiction between Schumpeterian party-competitive electoral democracy and a non-party 
consensual democracy. As Pitkin (2004, p. 337) puts it, “It is a matter of degree, an idea or 
ideal  realized  more  or  less  well  in  various  circumstances,  conditions,  and  institutional 
arrangements”. Because of the extreme expense of getting informed in large political settings 
when making political  decisions, shortcuts toward this information are being used. Such  a 
shortcut could be relying on the manifestos of parties and the solidity of representatives, thus 
recognizing  large  scale  representative  democracy  in  large  countries  as  rational  without  it 
connoting  irrationality  in  other  systems,  such  as  the  Isle  of  Man.  In  an  attempt  to  be T. Ahlbom 
  132
overwhelmingly diplomatic, one could argue that since our everyday life does not take place in 
a model world, but a world of imperfect information, states and individuals create structures 
within which they act in order to overcome information costs. The relative cost of information 
is therefore likely to shape the structures of political action. 
The political society of the Isle of Man is in many ways a flat one; hierarchies dragged 
down  by  the  Manx  Crabs  Syndrome,  the  members  of  the  bucket  society  inevitably  co-
dependent. “In such places [small islands], differences among individuals are often ignored, 
and a confining sense of geographical limits reduces the interpersonal friction”, argues Dag 
Anckar  (1999,  p.  41).  Is  this  ignorance  necessarily  a  bad  thing?  Is  this  an  acceptance  of 
differences or an attempt to eliminate them? Is this hell for dissidents or the nature of small 
island societies because “you cannot, in a community this size, ignore people; you can’t ignore 
them! You bump into them!” (Ahlbom 2013, p. 25), as an Isle of Man resident explains? If you 
cannot ignore a person because you are stuck together on a small island in the Irish Sea, or any 
other sea for that matter, you may actually benefit from disregarding the attitudinal differences 
between the two of you and focus on your mutual preferences rather than programmatically 
dissociate oneself from the other. The social climate of small island states or jurisdictions is not 
always  pleasant  for  everyone,  nor  is  every  homogenous  small  island  state,  a  small  island 
jurisdiction  or  a  bucket  of  Manx  crabs  by  definition  a  well-functioning  democracy.  Yet, 
homogeneity  is  not  inherently  contradictory  to  rationality  and  democratic  government,  but 
might actually be an advantage within a specific institutional framework.  
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